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ABSTRACT 
Revenue sharing is a common league policy in professional sports leagues. Several motivations 
for revenue sharing have been explored in the literature, including supporting small market 
teams, affecting league parity, suppressing player salaries and improving team profitability. We 
investigate a different motivation. Risk-averse team owners may be able to increase league 
welfare by using revenue sharing to reduce the variance and affect the skewness of the league 
distribution of team local revenues. We first determine the extent to which revenue sharing 
affects these moments in theory, then we attempt to quantify the effects on league welfare for 
Major League Baseball. Our results suggest that revenue sharing had significant welfare gains, 
obtained at little cost, that enhance the positive effects noted by other studies. (JEL: Z28) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many papers in the sports economics literature have studied the effects of different types of 
revenue sharing systems on league outcomes. The majority have focused on the effects on league 
parity using both theoretical models (Kesenne (2015, 2000), Miller (2007), Rockerbie (2009), 
Szymanski (2004) and Vrooman (2009) are examples), and empirical evidence (Maxcy (2009)). 
Others have focused on the effects on player salaries (Hill and Jolly (2015)), while others have 
focused on team profitability (Easton and Rockerbie (2005), Kesenne (2007)). These papers 
assume that the motivation for a league to adopt revenue sharing is to encourage financial 
stability and minimize the credible threats of rival leagues. Financial stability is an often used 
term that is addressed only indirectly by creating links between parity and profitability to 
financial stability. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the effects of revenue sharing on 
financial stability more directly by considering its effects on the league distribution of local 
revenues and the potential benefits (and costs) they generate for league welfare. Specifically we 
show that a straight pool revenue sharing system reduces the variance and skewness of the 
league revenue distribution in a systematic but non-linear fashion. We then quantify the welfare 
gains to a league by assuming a risk-averse league commissioner whose objective is to improve 
league welfare. Our results using data for Major League Baseball (MLB) suggest that these 
welfare gains can be significant and provide a motivation for revenue sharing that have not seen 
explored in the literature. 
 
A growing literature has considered how trade-induced economic growth has resulted in greater 
income inequality (Dixit and Norman (1986), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)) and how an income 
tax system can redistribute income to enhance the potential gains from free trade and integration. 
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Revenue sharing has traditionally been used as a tax-like method to redistribute revenues from 
rich to poor teams in professional sports leagues. We focus on sharing of local revenues in this 
paper. However sharing of marketing, media and television revenues has become a standard 
practice as well. The National League of MLB adopted gate revenue sharing in 1876 and the 
American League in 1903 (fixed dollar amounts per home ticket sold)1. The National Hockey 
League (NHL) adopted a limited gate revenue sharing plan in 1925 (3.5% of home gate 
receipts)2 and the National Football League (NFL) a much more extensive gate sharing plan in 
1960 (40% of home gate receipts).3 Early in their histories, leagues often adopted revenue 
sharing often during periods of rapid expansion that created a large imbalance in league 
revenues. Maintaining the financial stability of the league was important to insure that teams had 
opponents to play games against and to stave off the threat of rival leagues.4 Today’s revenue 
sharing plans are complex and extensive and are agreed to with the players in their collective 
bargaining agreements. Virtually all local revenues are shared to some extent, including local 
television network and cable revenues.  
 
Theoretical models have focused mainly on the effects on parity and team profitability in levels. 
However, it is uncertain how a movement towards or away from parity in winning percentages 
affects the stability of league revenues. We consider the effects of revenue sharing on the league 
                                                            
1 See Surdham (2007). 
2 See Ross (2015). 
3 See Surdham (2007). 
4 The NHL welcomed the Boston Bruins, New York Americans and Pittsburgh Pirates in 1925 and approved new 
franchises in Chicago and Detroit in 1926. The addition of these large American cities to the much smaller four 
Canadian cities already in the NHL created a bidding war for professional players that put the smaller franchises at a 
considerable financial disadvantage. The NFL had just survived the threat of the now defunct All-American Football 
Conference (AAFC) by absorbing three AAFC teams in 1950. The new American Football League (AFL) began 
operations in 1960 as a direct competitor to the long-established NFL. 
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distribution of team revenues in terms of its second (variance) and third (skewness) moments. 
Reducing its variance has obvious benefits with a risk-averse league commissioner, but reducing 
its skewness does not have as obvious benefits. Reducing skewness implies a more equitable 
(equal) distribution of team revenues – a desirable result for a league composed of socialist 
owners. But team owners are capitalists who prefer more to less and their commissioner is 
chosen to represent their financial interests. As we show, a league with a majority of teams above 
the average team revenue (negative skewness) is preferred to the opposite. While not the worst 
outcome, equality of team revenues is less preferred to negatively skewed revenues – a 
seemingly odd result, but one that is perfectly consistent with improving welfare.  
 
II. WELFARE AND REVENUES 
To motivate the consideration of league welfare from revenue sharing, we assume that team 
owners are risk-averse and maximize their utility from profit. This differs from the standard 
sports league model that assumes that risk-neutral team owners maximize profit. Consumers are 
often thought of as being risk averse when facing a gamble that affects their income or wealth. In 
the simplest case, a representative team owner faces uncertain revenue from season to season 
that takes on only two outcomes, high or low. These uncertain revenues arise from the inherent 
uncertainty of team performance due to injuries or changes in the performance of competing 
teams. While team owners do not have the choice of accepting a certainty equivalent amount of 
revenue, they may prefer league policies that reduce the variance of team revenues and raise their 
utility. Krautmann (2017) finds evidence to suggest that team owners demonstrate risk aversion 
by paying a premium to MLB players who demonstrate consistent performance. Maxcy (2004) 
suggests that team owners reward consistent players with longer term contracts. Consistent 
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player performance could translate into consistent team revenues, suggesting that team owners 
value consistent revenues. 
 
Our sports league is composed of n teams. Each team owner contributes a share (1-) of its local 
revenue into a straight pool which is then divided evenly among the team owners at the end of 
each playing season. Local revenues are obtained primarily from ticket sales but also contain 
other local revenues that increase with the performance of the team. We ignore other types of 
revenue that are not typically dependent upon team performance. To focus on welfare 
consequences of revenue sharing, we do not explicitly model the determination of the profit-
maximizing revenue for each team in order, although we acknowledge that revenue sharing can 
affect the optimal choice of talent and thus team revenue (references).  
 
Revenue for team i after revenue sharing (where an “A” distinguishes revenue after sharing) is 
given by 
 
𝑅𝑖
𝐴 = 𝛼𝑅𝑖 +  (1 − 𝛼) ∑ 𝑅𝑗 𝑛⁄ = 𝛼𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼)?̅?      (1) 
 
In (1), ?̅? = ∑ 𝑅𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑛⁄ , the team average local revenue for the league before revenue sharing.
5 
We assume that revenue sharing does not affect team owner incentives to acquire talent and earn 
revenue. Effectively this means that for any team i, 𝑅𝑖 ≠ 𝑅𝑖(𝛼, 𝑤𝑖), where 𝑤𝑖 is winning 
                                                            
5 It is easy to show that the average local revenue is unchanged by revenue sharing. Using (1), ?̅?𝐴 = ∑ 𝑅𝑗
𝐴 𝑛⁄ =
(∑ 𝛼𝑅𝑗 + ∑(1 − 𝛼)?̅?) 𝑛⁄ = 𝛼?̅? + (1 − 𝛼)?̅? = ?̅?. 
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percentage. If we think of revenue sharing as a constant tax rate on revenue, it is easy to show 
that team owners will simply maximize team revenue and then pay the revenue sharing tax, 
regardless of the value of the tax rate.  
 
Since that the survival of other teams is necessary to carry on a business, we assume that each 
team owner cares about the economic health of the league. To this end, owners elect a league 
Commissioner by a simple majority vote who acts as a responsible agent for the owners. Utility 
for the Commissioner is representative of the joint utility of the owners and is calculated as a 
constant relative risk aversion utility function of the form6 
 
𝑈 = 𝑅1−𝜃 1 − 𝜃⁄           (2) 
 
The  term is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and R is total league local revenue. Our 
measure of welfare differs from those found in the sports economics literature. Fort and Quirk 
(2010a, 2010b) use the sum of consumer and producer surpluses to compare welfare at different 
levels of league parity. Dietl and Lang (2008) show that revenue sharing increases consumer 
surplus and team profits. In the first instance, revenue sharing affects the league distribution of 
revenues and we focus our analysis on any welfare effects that results. To estimate league 
                                                            
6 The CRRA utility function is a popular choice in models of consumption and real business cycles for two reasons: 
risk aversion is invariant to the level of consumption, income and wealth; utility is stationary, that is, moving the 
same consumption path forward one or more periods does not change the preference ordering. See Lucas (1987). 
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welfare, we take a Taylor series expansion of (2) expanded around the mean of league revenue, 
limited to the first four terms.7 
 
𝑈1 = 𝑅
1−𝜃 1 − 𝜃⁄ + ?̅?−𝜃(𝑅 − ?̅?) −
𝜃
2
?̅?−𝜃−1(𝑅 − ?̅?)2 +
𝜃(𝜃−1)
6
?̅?−𝜃−2(𝑅 − ?̅?)3  (3) 
 
Before revenue sharing, league revenue can deviate from its mean due to shocks that we specify 
as 𝑅 = ?̅? + 𝑒 without specifying the nature of these shocks, but assuming that 𝐸(𝑒) = 0 and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒) = 𝜎2. Obviously these league shocks are a summation of the shocks to individual team 
revenues in a manner, that for simplicity, we do not specify. The mean league revenue is 
unchanged after revenue sharing hence the second term in (3) vanishes after taking the expected 
value, however the variance and skewness of league revenue after revenue sharing, denoted 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2
= 𝜎𝐴
2 =
1
𝑛
∑(𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2
 and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?)
3
= 𝑍𝐴
3 =
1
𝑛
∑(𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?)
3
 respectively, may 
not be.8  
 
𝐸(𝑈1) = 𝑅
1−𝜃 1 − 𝜃⁄ −
𝜃
2
?̅?−(1+𝜃)𝜎𝐴
2 +
𝜃(𝜃−1)
6
?̅?−(2+𝜃)𝑍𝐴
3     (4) 
 
                                                            
7 Lucas (1987) used the same expansion method to evaluate the welfare gain from consumption smoothing. He did 
not expand to the fourth term in (3) since he did not have the data necessary to compute the necessary moments of 
the distribution of U.S. consumption. 
8 Note that 𝑍𝐴
3 is not the coefficient of skewness, defined as 𝑛−1 ∑((𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?) 𝜎𝐴⁄ )
3 = (𝑛𝜎𝐴
3)−1𝑍𝐴
3, however we refer 
to it as a measure of skewness in the rest of the paper.  
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Risk aversion suggests that greater variability in team revenues (𝜎𝐴
2) reduces utility. Risk averse 
team owners seek to reduce the variability in revenues by diversifying their revenue “portfolios” 
and revenue sharing provides a mechanism to do this, although we do not pursue this team-
specific portfolio effect.9 Rather we assume that the Commissioner is concerned with the 
variance and skewness of the distribution of team revenues around the team average. 
 
The effect of skewness on utility depends upon the degree of relative risk aversion. If the 
Commissioner is somewhat risk averse, it is likely that  > 1 and negative skewness in revenues 
(𝑍𝐴
3 > 0) will increase utility.10 Negative skewness can imply many teams with revenues above 
the league average or a few teams with very large revenues above the league average. This 
increases utility for the league, in the first case at the expense of a few teams well below the 
league average. Unfortunately we cannot distinguish between the first and second cases based 
only on negative skewness. What we can say is that any movement towards negative skewness is 
preferred, defeating the argument that the best result is equality of team revenues. Negative 
skewness indicates that there is more league revenue above the average than below, but not 
necessarily more teams with revenue above the league average. 
                                                            
9 Revenue sharing in the form assumed in this paper allows team owners to diversify their revenue portfolios by 
essentially investing in the economic health of other teams. Two requirements are necessary for team owners to 
benefit from a portfolio effect. First, team revenues should display some sort of cyclical behavior; second, and 
related to the first requirement, a majority of teams should display a negative covariance with revenues of other 
teams or the league average revenue. Most professional sports teams have periods of strong revenue growth 
followed by periods of revenue stagnation or decline. The cyclical nature of winning percentages and a possible 
cause of this has been explored by Easton and Rockerbie (2010) and Rockerbie and Easton (2014). Revenues are at 
least partially determined by success on the field, however the cyclical nature of team revenues has not been deeply 
explored in the literature. The majority of team owners that vote in favor of revenue sharing might do so if they 
perceive benefitting from the portfolio effect, implying their local revenue displays a negative covariance with the 
local revenues of other teams. 
10 In the special case of  = 1, we have a log utility function and skewness does not affect utility by inspection of (4).  
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It is important not to confuse skewness in revenues with a lack of revenue equity that some 
might associate with lower welfare. In our model, the Commissioner wishes to see the majority 
of teams doing well on the revenue side. How revenue sharing affects skewness specifically is 
addressed in a later section, however any improvement in revenue equity, as measured by a 
movement to a more symmetric league revenue distribution from negative skewness, will lower 
league welfare. 
 
Revenue sharing and the variance of team revenues 
To calculate the variance of team revenues after revenue sharing, one might be tempted to use 
the simple rule of variances that 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑋 = 𝑎2𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑋 since part of local revenue after sharing is 
just 𝛼𝑅𝑖, but this would ignore the payment received from the revenue sharing pool. The 
variance of team revenues around the league average after revenue sharing is not as obvious as 
the simple rule, but not hard to derive. 
 
𝜎𝐴
2 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑗
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2
=
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑗
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑗=1        (5) 
 
Consider the bracketed term only for team i and insert (1). 
 
(𝑅𝑖
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2
= (𝛼𝑅𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼)?̅? − ?̅?)
2 = (𝛼(𝑅𝑖 − ?̅?))
2
= 𝛼2(𝑅𝑖 − ?̅?)
2   (6) 
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Each of the n teams will have the same expression as (6) with the terms inside the bracket using 
values for the individual team. Summing over the n teams gives  
 
𝜎𝐴
2 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑗
𝐴 − ?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑗=1 = 𝛼
2 1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑗 − ?̅?)
2
= 𝛼2𝜎2𝑛𝑗=1      (7) 
 
The reduction in the variance of league revenues after revenue sharing is proportional to 𝛼2. If 
we think of the variance of local revenues as a measure of risk, revenue sharing reduces this risk 
by a factor of 0.692 = 0.4761 in MLB (as per the 2016 CBA), a significant reduction.  
 
Risk averse team owners will value the reduction in risk that revenue sharing delivers. But by 
how much? The relevant part of (4) is −
𝜃
2
?̅?−(1+𝜃)𝜎𝐴
2. Consider a one-shot adoption of revenue 
sharing that reduces  = 1 to  = 0.69. Expressing the increase in utility relative to marginal 
utility (evaluated at the team average local revenue) gives the increase in dollars per unit of 
utility. Next dividing by the average local revenue for the league expresses the welfare change as 
a percentage of average league revenue. 
 
∆𝑈/𝑈′
?̅?
= −(𝜃 2𝑅̅̅̅̅ 2⁄ )𝜎2(0.692 − 1) = (𝜃 2𝑅̅̅̅̅ 2⁄ )0.5239𝜎2 > 0    (8) 
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The larger the variance in league local revenues before revenue sharing, the larger the welfare 
gains from revenue sharing, and the larger is the average local revenue of the league, the smaller 
are the welfare gains from revenue sharing. Leagues composed of very wealthy teams playing in 
large markets may stand little to gain in welfare by instituting revenue sharing.  
 
Revenue sharing and the skewness of team revenues 
Skewness is also important to the Commissioner when considering league welfare. Negative 
skewness provides higher welfare since many teams are above the league average local revenue. 
Skewness after revenue sharing is defined as 
 
𝑍𝐴
3 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑗
𝐴 − ?̅?)
3
=
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑅𝑗
𝐴 − ?̅?)
3𝑛
𝑗=1        (9) 
 
Using the same method used to derive the variance, the skewness in local revenues is given by 
 
𝑍𝐴
3 = 𝛼3𝑍3           (10) 
 
The reduction in skewness of the league revenue distribution that revenue sharing delivers is 
proportional to 𝛼3. For MLB, this is 0.693 = 0.3285, again a significant reduction, but in this 
case, a reduction in welfare for the league if the league revenue distribution is negatively 
skewed.  
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How much will the Commissioner value the reduction in skewness with greater revenue sharing? 
The relevant part of (4) is  
𝜃(𝜃−1)
6
?̅?−(2+𝜃)𝑍𝐴
3. Again expressing the increase in utility relative to 
marginal utility and then as a percentage of average league revenue gives the increase in welfare 
for the Commissioner by increasing revenue sharing. 
 
∆𝑈/𝑈′
?̅?
=
𝜃(𝜃−1)
6?̅?3
𝑍3(0.693 − 1) = −
𝜃(𝜃−1)
6?̅?3
0.6715𝑍3 < 0     (11) 
 
The comparative static result in (11) assumes that 𝑍3 > 0, but if in fact 𝑍3 < 0, then (11) is 
positive.  
 
III. OVERALL WELFARE GAINS FROM REVENUE SHARING 
Revenue sharing increases league welfare by reducing the variance of local revenues around the 
league average, but lowers welfare by transferring revenue from teams above the league average 
to teams below the league average, reducing any negative skewness. The net change in league 
welfare is the sum of (10) and (11). 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 
∆𝑈 𝑈′⁄
?̅?
= (𝜃(𝜃 − 1)(𝛼3 − 1)𝑍3 − 3𝜃?̅?(𝛼2 − 1)𝜎2) 6?̅?3⁄     (12) 
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The measurement of the welfare gain in (12) requires accurate data concerning the distribution of 
team revenues to be meaningful. Professional sports leagues do not make these data publicly 
available. We require local revenues before revenue sharing for every team in a professional 
sports league. MLB released accurate data for the 1995 through 2001 seasons in a supplement to 
its Blue Ribbon report (MLB 2001). Team local revenues before revenue sharing are reported in 
Table 27 of the report.11 Unfortunately MLB did not use the straight-pool revenue sharing plan 
that we assumed in deriving equations (7) and (10) in any of these seasons. The long-standing 
gate sharing plan was used in both the NL and the AL in the 1995 season. The 1996-2001 
seasons saw MLB experimenting with different hybrid plans in each season. It was not until the 
2002 season that MLB adopted the simple straight-pool revenue sharing plan that required each 
team to contribute 34% of its local revenue to the pool, with the pool then split up evenly among 
all 30 teams. The 2007 CBA saw the contribution rate drop to 31% with no other changes. Two 
revenue sharing pools were created in the 2012 CBA: a basic pool that is no different from the 
2002 plan and a supplemental pool (approximately 14% contribution rate) where payments from 
the pool were made based on the estimated sizes of the local television markets.  
 
The Blue Ribbon report provided a unique glimpse into the financial numbers for MLB.12 As 
much as we would like to use data from the report, we cannot for two reasons. First, as already 
noted, the derivations of equations (7) and (10) that determine the properties of straight-pool 
                                                            
11 Local revenue consists of gate receipts, local television, radio and cable rights fees, ballpark concessions, local 
advertising, sponsorship and publications, parking, suite rentals and postseason and spring training revenues. Local 
revenues are the largest single component of most clubs’ total annual revenues. 
12 Financial statements for MLB clubs are sometimes leaked by the press or presented voluntarily by MLB clubs, but 
only sporadically. See Rod Fort’s website for limited data for the Seattle Mariners, Milwaukee Brewers and 
Cleveland Indians (https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes). More recent data for the Los Angeles Angels, 
Florida Marlins and Pittsburgh Pirates can be found at http://deadspin.com/5615096/mlb-confidential-the-financial-
documents-baseball-doesnt-want-you-to-see-part-1. 
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revenue sharing on the variance and skewness of the league revenue distribution do not hold for 
the forms of revenue sharing used in the 1995-2001 seasons. Second, team owners form 
expectations of the amount of revenue to be contributed to the revenue sharing pool when 
making their talent acquisitions, setting ticket prices and other financial decisions. The pre-
revenue sharing local revenue figures incorporate these decisions. Using local revenue data for 
different revenue sharing plans is not consistent with team owner expectations.  
 
Forbes magazine publishes estimates of gate revenue before revenue sharing for MLB beginning 
in 1990. We have chosen the 2002-2011 MLB seasons since the straight-pool revenue sharing 
plan was used in each season. Forbes reports estimates of gate revenue, other revenue, and total 
revenue.13 Other revenue includes all other sources of local revenue (parking, concessions, 
marketing, local media and so on) as well as the net revenue sharing payment received and the 
share of the national broadcast revenue. To evaluate equation (12), we require total local revenue 
before revenue sharing. We first subtract the share of the national television broadcast revenue 
from the reported total local revenue14. All of the remaining local revenue is shared and is 
reported net of any revenue sharing payment. We calculate local revenue before sharing using 
the formula 𝑅1 = (𝑅1
𝐴 − (1 − 𝑎)?̅?) 𝛼⁄  using the values  = 0.66 and  = 0.69 for the 2002-06 
and 2007-11 periods respectively. Finally, we divided by the national consumer price index 
(2002 = 100) to convert to real local revenues.15  
 
                                                            
13 The data are conveniently located at Rod Fort’s website, https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes. 
14 Each team received approximately $18.6 million in each of the 2002 through 2006 seasons and $23.7 million in 
each of the 2007 through 2011 seasons. https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes. 
15 http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ 
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In our Table 1, we estimate the welfare gains to MLB in 2002-11 seasons after hypothetically 
adopting the straight-pool revenue sharing plan adopted in 2002 in a one-shot fashion. We use 
the parameter values  = 0.66 (2002-06),  = 0.69 (2002-11)and  = 2. Our choice of value for  
is survey evidence found in and Mehra and Prescott (1985), however we also used values 
between 1 and 3 with little change in the results. The welfare gain due to the decrease in the 
variance of team revenues ranged from 6.3% to 13.7%, averaging 9.4% of the average team 
revenue, over and above what the welfare change would have been without revenue sharing.. 
The welfare losses due to moving to positive skewness were modest, ranging from -1.5% to -
7.7%, averaging -3.1%. The local revenue distributions were slightly negatively skewed in these 
seasons. Revenue sharing results in a transfer of revenue to those teams below the league average 
revenue, resulting in a more symmetric revenue distribution and reducing welfare in (4). This 
effect was evident in all of the 2002-11 seasons. Figures 1 and 2 are histograms of the 
standardized values of team local revenues for the 2002 and 2011 seasons. In 2002, 11 out of 28 
teams (39.3%) experienced pre-revenue sharing local revenue above the league average. By 
2011, this increased to 13 out of 30 teams (43.3%). The top local revenue team was the New 
York Yankees in both seasons. The Yankees pre-revenue sharing local revenue was 5.12 
standard deviations above the average in 2002, increasing to 6.57 standard deviations in 2011, 
despite the league standard deviation being virtually unchanged between the two seasons.16 The 
increase in negative skewness would have increased league welfare without revenue sharing, 
however with revenue sharing, league welfare decreased from the resulting decrease in negative 
skewness. 
                                                            
16 The Montreal Expos move to Washington for the 2005 season reduced the standard deviation of pre-revenue 
sharing local revenues from $62.4 million to $55.6 million and increased the average from $156.1 million to $165.7 
million. This one move may have had a larger effect on league welfare than the revenue sharing plan. 
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The last row of Table 1 presents the welfare gain or loss from revenue sharing in Dollars. The 
present value of these gains or losses is $86.0 million in 2002 using a 3% discount rate or $89.4 
million using a 2% discount rate.17 Almost all of this net welfare gain arises from the decrease in 
the variance of team revenues that revenue sharing delivers.18 The net welfare gain could have 
been much larger if the league local revenue distribution did not become increasingly negatively 
skewed over the seven seasons, from a skewness coefficient value of 0.935 in 2002 to 2.448 in 
the 2011 season. Ignoring the skewness effect on the league revenue distribution, the present 
value of the net welfare gain only due to the reduction in the variance is $126.8 million in 2002.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated significant welfare gains to MLB from the straight pool revenue sharing 
system adopted in the 2002 CBA. However, our measures of welfare gain could be understated 
for several reasons. It could be that team owners are more risk-averse than we have assumed, 
implying that our values for  are too small, but this seems unlikely. At the league level, stability 
of revenues could enhance the ability of a league commissioner to negotiate lucrative rights 
packages for television, internet, merchandising and so on. In the past, revenue sharing has also 
been a useful policy to prevent the formation of rival leagues by making the existing league 
attractive to cities that wish to join. At the team level, revenue sharing reduces the variance of 
local revenues and hence reduces risk. This could have two beneficial effects for team owners. 
                                                            
17 The average real interest rate (reported by the World Bank) was 3% for the U.S. over the 2002-2011 period. 
18 It is interesting to note that it is not the case that higher risk aversion always increases the welfare gain from 
revenue sharing. This can be seen through inspection of the numerator of (12). Our welfare gain in (12) reached a 
peak of $86.1 million at  = 2.1 and a 3% discount rate. 
18 
 
Lower risk can reduce the capital costs of new facilities for teams that wish to finance a portion 
or all of new facilities. Local governments might be more willing to pick up a portion of the 
construction costs when they know the team is on a stable financial footing and unlikely to leave 
for greener pastures once construction is finished. More importantly for team owners, low 
financial risk enhances the market value of the team when potential buyers are risk-averse. For 
many team owners, the financial rewards are the greatest when the team is sold.  
 
Given that revenue sharing costs little to implement, it would seem to be advantageous for a 
professional sports league to adopt it. In fact, further welfare gains could be had by utilizing a 
progressive revenue tax. However the wealthiest teams could oppose revenue sharing since the 
system penalizes on-field success and financial smarts. MLB has used a progressive competitive 
balance tax since the 1996 CBA. Teams pay a tax rate of 22.5% of the payroll overage if their 
payrolls exceed the payroll threshold set in the most current CBA ($195 million for the 2017 
season) if they are first-time offenders. The tax rate increases to 30% for second-time offenders, 
40% for third-time offenders and 50% for four or more offenses. It is estimated that the New 
York Yankees paid $304 million in tax over the 2002-16 seasons.19 Even though the tax system 
is progressive in some sense, the tax revenue is not redistributed to any of the MLB teams, hence 
the tax system lacks the redistributive effects of revenue sharing. Neither revenue sharing nor the 
competitive balance tax are ideal systems in a league welfare sense. 
 
                                                            
19 Orinick, S. Competitive balance tax. http://www.stevetheump.com/luxury_tax.htm. Accessed on 02/08/2017. 
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Mirlees (1971) demonstrated that an optimal income tax system still features a progressive 
income tax rate, even after accounting for the negative work-incentive effects of the tax, 
although his criteria of welfare differed from ours in that he focused on utility from consumption 
for individual workers. It would be useful to explore whether the same result holds for the use of 
revenue sharing in a professional sports league using our measure of league welfare. However it 
would necessitating specifying how the progressive revenue sharing tax affects the talent 
decisions of team owners, which is, stating what the function 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖(𝛼, 𝑤𝑖) looks like.
20 We 
leave that problem for future research. 
 
  
                                                            
20 Marburger (1997) considers the effect of a progressive competitive balance tax on owner incentives and 
equilibrium outcomes, but does not consider a progressive revenue sharing tax. 
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TABLE 1 
Welfare gains to MLB, 2002-11 seasons. ( = 0.66 (2002-06),  = 0.69 (2007-11),  = 2) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
?̅? ($ millions) 141.75 146.91 156.09 165.72 169.04 151.20 153.54 144.53 161.02 162.19 
𝜎2 4382.2 3354.1 3889.8 3086.0 3450.8 3346.9 4032.3 5070.2 4423.2 4559.0 
𝑍3 271146 317344 326126 250310 300939 294511 540408 984473 755352 753520 
Welfare gain 
from variance1 0.123 0.088 0.090 0.063 0.068 0.083 0.097 0.137 0.096 0.098 
Welfare gain 
from 
skewness1 -0.023 -0.024 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.020 -0.035 -0.077 -0.043 -0.042 
Total welfare 
gain1 0.1005 0.0639 0.0697 0.0504 0.0534 0.0624 0.0611 0.0595 0.0533 0.0559 
Total welfare 
gain in $ 
millions 14.24 9.39 10.89 8.35 9.02 9.43 9.38 8.61 8.58 9.06 
 
1 As a percentage (x100) of the average team local revenue. 
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FIGURE 1 
Pre-revenue sharing local revenues in MLB, 2002. 
(Average = $141.8 million) 
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FIGURE 2 
Pre-revenue sharing local revenues in MLB, 2011. 
(Average = $162.2 million) 
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